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Abstract— We consider the problem of secure communication
with multi-antenna transmission in fading channels. The trans-
mitter simultaneously transmits an information bearing signal to
the intended receiver and artificial noise to the eavesdroppers.
We obtain an analytical closed-form expression of an achievable
secrecy rate, and use it as the objective function to optimize the
transmit power allocation between the information signal and the
artificial noise. Our analytical and numerical results show that
equal power allocation is a simple yet near optimal strategy for
the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers. When the number of
colluding eavesdroppers increases, more power should be used
to generate the artificial noise. We also provide an upper bound
on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) above which the achievable
secrecy rate is positive and show that the bound is tight at low
SNR. Furthermore, we consider the impact of imperfect channel
state information (CSI) at both the transmitter and the receiver
and find that it is wise to create more artificial noise to confuse
the eavesdroppers than to increase the signal strength for the
intended receiver if the CSI is not accurately obtained.
Index Terms— Secrecy rate, multi-antenna transmission, arti-
ficial noise, power allocation, channel estimation error.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a fundamental problem in wireless communi-
cations due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium.
Traditionally, secure communication is achieved by using
cryptographic technologies such as encryption. On the other
hand, the studies from an information-theoretic viewpoint have
found conditions for reliable secure communication without
using secret keys. In the pioneering works on information-
theoretic security, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel
model in which the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded
version of the receiver’s channel [1]. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
considered a general non-degraded channel condition and
studied the transmission of both a common message to two
receivers and a confidential message to only one of them [2].
The results in these early works showed that a positive secrecy
capacity can be achieved if the intended receiver has a better
channel than the eavesdropper.
Recently, information-theoretic security with multi-antenna
transmission has drawn a lot of attention. Many works have
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been devoted to analyzing the secrecy capacity with various
antenna configurations and channel conditions, e.g., [3–6].
With multiple antennas at the transmitter, the optimal input
structure (for Gaussian codes) that maximizes the secrecy
rate of Gaussian channels was found to be in the form
of beamforming transmission [3, 4]. The secrecy capacity of
Gaussian channels with multiple antennas at both the trans-
mitter and the receiver was obtained in [5, 6]. One of the
main assumptions in the above-mentioned works is that the
eavesdropper’s channel is known at the transmitter. Clearly
this assumption is usually impractical, especially for fading
channels. The ergodic secrecy capacity with and without
knowing the eavesdropper’s channel was studied for fading
channels in [7–11]. The authors in [9] studied a fading
broadcast channel with confidential information intended only
for one receiver and derived the optimal power allocation
that minimizes the secrecy outage probability. The authors
in [10] proposed an on-off power transmission with variable-
rate allocation scheme for single antenna systems, which was
shown to approach the optimal performance at asymptotically
high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The authors in [11] extended
the ergodic secrecy capacity result to systems with multiple
antennas and developed capacity bounds in the large antenna
limit.
Furthermore, various physical-layer techniques were pro-
posed to achieve secure communication even if the receiver’s
channel is worse than the eavesdropper’s channel. One of
the main techniques is the use of interference or artificial
noise to confuse the eavesdropper. With two base stations
connected by a high capacity backbone, one base station can
simultaneously transmit an interfering signal to secure the
uplink communication for the other base station [12, 13]. In
the scenario where the transmitter has a helping interferer
or a relay node, the secrecy level can also be increased by
having the interferer [14] or relay [15] to send codewords
independent of the source message at an appropriate rate.
When multiple cooperative nodes are available to help the
transmitter, the optimal weights of the signal transmitted from
cooperative nodes, which maximize an achievable secrecy rate,
were derived for both decode-and-forward [16] and amplify-
and-forward [17] protocols. The use of interference for secrecy
is also extended to multiple-access and broadcast channels
with user cooperation [18–20].
When multiple antennas are available at the transmitter, it
is possible to simultaneously transmit both the information
bearing signal and artificial noise to achieve secrecy in a
fading environment [21–23]. The artificial noise is radiated
isotropically to mask the transmission of the information
signal to the intended receiver. In the design of this multi-
antenna technique, the transmit power allocation between the
information signal and the artificial noise is an important
parameter, which has not been investigated in [21, 22]. A
sub-optimal power allocation strategy was considered in [23],
which aims to meet a target signal to interference and noise
ratio at the intended receiver to satisfy a quality of service
requirement.
In this paper, we study the problem of secure commu-
nication in fading channels with a multi-antenna transmitter
capable of simultaneous transmission of both the information
signal and the artificial noise. We derive a closed-form ex-
pression for an achievable secrecy rate in fading channels.
The availability of a closed-form secrecy rate expression
greatly reduces the complexity of obtaining the optimal power
allocation between transmission of the information signal and
the artificial noise. We also study the critical SNR above which
the achievable secrecy rate is positive. This is an important
problem in wideband communications in which a higher
throughput is achieved by reducing the SNR per hertz while
increasing the bandwidth [24]. Furthermore, perfect channel
state information (CSI) at both the transmitter and the receiver
is usually assumed in the existing studies on information-
theoretic security. With this assumption, the artificial noise
is accurately transmitted into the null space of the intended
receiver’s channel. When the CSI is not perfectly known at the
transmitter, the artificial noise leaks into the receiver’s channel.
The effects of imperfect CSI on the achievable secrecy rate and
the aforementioned design parameters are investigated in this
paper.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows:
• In Section III, we derive analytical closed-form lower
bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity for both non-
colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. These closed-
form expressions, which give achievable secrecy rates
for secure communications with artificial noise, greatly
reduce the complexity of system design and analysis, and
also allow analytical insights to be obtained.
• In Section IV, we study the optimal power allocation
between transmission of the information signal and the
artificial noise. For the non-colluding eavesdropper case,
the equal power allocation is shown to be a simple
strategy that achieves nearly the same secrecy rate as the
optimal power allocation. For the colluding eavesdropper
case, more power should be used to transmit the artificial
noise as the number of eavesdropper increases. Analytical
results are obtained in the high SNR regime in both cases.
• In Section V, we derive an upper bound on the critical
SNR above which the achievable secrecy rate is positive.
The bound is shown to be tight at low SNR, hence is
useful in the design and analysis of wideband secure
communications.
• In Section VI, we derive an ergodic secrecy capacity
lower bound taking into account channel estimation er-
rors and investigate the effects of imperfect CSI on the
optimal power allocation and the critical SNR for secure
communication. In particular, we find that it is better to
create more artificial noise for the eavesdroppers than to
increase the signal strength for the intended receiver as
the channel estimation error increases.
Throughout the paper, the following notations will be used:
Boldface upper and lower cases denote matrices and vectors,
respectively. [·]T denotes the matrix transpose operation, [·]∗
denotes the complex conjugate operation, and [·]† denotes the
conjugate transpose operation. The notation E{·} denotes the
mathematical expectation. ‖ · ‖ denotes the norm of a vector
and | · | denotes the determinant of a matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure communication between a transmitter
(Alice) and a receiver (Bob) in the presence of eavesdroppers
(Eves). Alice has NA antennas (NA > 1) and Bob has a
single antenna. This scenario is representative, for example, of
downlink transmission in cellular systems and wireless local
area networks. In addition, each Eve is equipped with a single
antenna. We consider two cases, namely non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers. In the former case, Eves individually
overhear the communication between Alice and Bob without
any centralized processing. While in the latter case, there
are NE Eves capable of jointly processing their received
information. Therefore, the non-colluding case can be seen
as a special colluding case where NE = 1. We assume that
NA > NE for which the reason will become clear in the next
section. We also assume that Eves are passive, hence they
cannot transmit jamming signals. The received symbols at Bob
and the multiple colluding Eves are given by, respectively,
yB = hx+ n, (1)
yE = Gx+ e, (2)
where h is a 1×NA vector denoting the channel between Alice
and Bob and G is an NE ×NA matrix denoting the channel
between Alice and multiple colluding Eves. The elements of h
and G are independent zero-mean complex Gaussian random
variables. n and e are the additive white Gaussian noises at
Bob and Eves, respectively. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the variance of n to unity. We assume that h is
accurately estimated by Bob and is also known by Alice
using a noiseless feedback link from Bob1. Similar to [21],
we assume that the knowledge of both h and G is available at
Eve, which makes the secrecy of communication independent
of the secrecy of channel gains.
The key idea of guaranteeing secure communication using
artificial noise proposed in [21] is outlined as follows. We
let an NA × NA matrix W = [w1 W 2] be an orthonormal
basis of CNA , where w1 = h†/‖h‖. The NA × 1 transmitted
symbol vector at Alice is given by x = w1u+W 2v, where
the variance of u is σ2u and the NA − 1 elements of v
1A reliable feedback link could be achieved by using low rate transmission
with appropriate quantization schemes. The design of a high-quality feedback
link and the effect of noisy feedback is beyond the scope of this work.
However, we will investigate the effect of imperfect channel knowledge at
Alice by considering channel estimation errors at Bob in Section VI.
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
Gaussian random variables each with variance σ2v . u represents
the information bearing signal and v represents the artificial
noise. The received symbols at Bob and Eves become
yB = hw1u+ hW 2v + n = ‖h‖u+ n, (3)
yE = Gw1u+GW 2v + e = g1u+G2v + e, (4)
where we have defined that g1 = Gw1 and G2 = GW 2.
We consider a total power per transmission denoted by P ,
that is, P = σ2u+(NA−1)σ2v . Due to the normalization of the
noise variance at Bob, we also refer to P as the transmit SNR.
One important design parameter is the ratio of power allocated
to the information bearing signal and the artificial noise. We
denote the fraction of total power allocated to the information
signal as φ. Hence, we have the following relationships:
σ2u = φP, (5)
σ2v = (1− φ)P/(NA − 1). (6)
Since h is known by Alice, she can adaptively change the
value of φ according to the instantaneous realization of h. We
refer to this strategy as the adaptive power allocation strategy.
Alternatively, Alice can choose a fixed value for φ regardless
of the instantaneous channel realization, which we refer to
as the non-adaptive power allocation strategy. Note that Alice
does not know G, and thus equally distributes the transmit
power amongst the artificial noise signal, as given by (6).
III. SECRECY CAPACITY LOWER BOUND
The secrecy capacity is the maximum transmission rate
at which the intended receiver can decode the data with
arbitrarily small error while the mutual information between
the transmitted message and the received signal at the eaves-
dropper is arbitrarily small. It is bounded from below by the
difference in the capacity of the channel between Alice and
Bob and that between Alice and Eve [2]. In this section,
we derive a closed-form expression for an ergodic secrecy
capacity lower bound with transmission of artificial noise.
The capacity of the channel between Alice and Bob is given
by
C1 = Eh{log2(1 + σ
2
u‖h‖
2)}
= Eh{log2(1 + φP‖h‖
2)}. (7)
Without loss of generality, we normalize the variance of
each element of h to unity. It is then easy to see that
‖h‖2 follows a Gamma distribution with parameters (NA, 1).
Therefore, for systems with non-adaptive power allocation
strategy, we can rewrite (7) in an integral form as
C1 =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + φPx)xNA−1
exp(−x)
Γ(NA)
dx,
=
1
ln 2
exp
( z
P
) NA∑
k=1
Ek
( z
P
)
, (8)
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function, En(·) is the generalized
exponential integral, (8) is obtained using an integral identity
given in [25], and we have defined z = φ−1.
Next we study the capacity of the channel between Alice
and multiple colluding Eves. When multiple Eves are present,
the noise at each Eve may be different. In addition, the receiver
noise levels at Eves may not be known by Alice and Bob.
To guarantee secure communication, it is therefore reasonable
to consider the worst case scenario where the noises at Eves
are arbitrarily small. Note that this approach was also taken
in [22]. In this case, we can normalize the distance of each
Eve to make the variance of the elements of G equal to unity
without loss of generality.2
The noiseless eavesdropper assumption effectively gives an
upper bound on the capacity of the channel between Alice and
multiple colluding Eves as
C2 = Eh,g
1
,G2
{
log2
∣∣∣I + σ2ug1g1†(σ2vG2G2†)−1∣∣∣}
= Eh,g
1
,G2
{
log2
(
1+
NA−1
z−1
g1
†(G2G2
†)−1g1
)}
, (9)
where we have again used z = φ−1. The expectation over h
in (9) is due to the fact that z may be dependent on h (which
happens when adaptive power allocation strategy is used). It is
required in (9) that G2G2† is invertible, which is guaranteed
with the assumption of NA > NE . If the assumption is
violated, the colluding eavesdroppers are able to eliminate
the artificial noise, resulting C2 = ∞. Hence, We assume
NA > NE for guaranteeing secure communication.
Since G has i.i.d. complex Gaussian entries and W is
a unitary matrix, GW = [g1 G2] also has i.i.d. complex
Gaussian entries. Therefore, the elements of g1 and G2 are
independent. As a result, the quantity g1†(G2G2†)−1g1 is
equivalent to the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) of a NE-
branch minimum mean square error (MMSE) diversity com-
biner with NA−1 interferers. The complementary cumulative
distribution function of X = g1†(G2G2†)−1g1 is given
in [26] as
RX(x) =
∑NE−1
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
xk
(1 + x)NA−1
. (10)
Therefore, we can rewrite (9) in an integral form as
C2 =Eh
{∫ ∞
0
log2
(
1 +
NA − 1
z − 1
x
)
fX(x)dx
}
=Eh
{ 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
NA−1
z−1
(
1+
NA−1
z−1
x
)−1
RX(x)dx
}
(11)
=Eh
{ 1
ln 2
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
×
∫ ∞
0
( z − 1
NA − 1
+ x
)−1
(1 + x)1−NAxkdx
}
=Eh
{ 1
ln 2
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1
B(k+1, NA−1−k)
× 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
)}
, (12)
2With the noiseless eavesdropper assumption, the capacity between Alice
and each Eve is determined from the signal-to-artificial-noise ratio. Consid-
ering the signal reception at a particular Eve, both the information signal and
the artificial noise are generated from the same source (Alice), and hence their
ratio is independent of the large scale fading from Alice to Eve. That is to
say, the signal-to-artificial-noise ratios are i.i.d. random variables for all Eves,
regardless of their distances from Alice.
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Fig. 1. Ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C in (14) versus SNR P for
systems with different numbers of antennas. The ratio of power allocation is
set to φ = 0.5.
where fX(x) denotes the probability density function of X ,
B(α, β) = Γ(α)Γ(β)Γ(α+β) is the Beta function and 2F1(·) is the
Gauss hypergeometric function. Note that (11) is obtained
using integration by parts, and (12) is obtained using an
integration identity given in [27].
After deriving expressions for C1 and C2, a lower bound
on the ergodic secrecy capacity can now be obtained as C =
[C1 − C2]
+
, where [α]+ = max{0, α}. This is a data rate
that can be always guaranteed for the secure communication
(without knowing the noise level at Eves). For systems with
adaptive power allocation, the ergodic secrecy capacity lower
bound is given as
C =
1
ln 2
[
Eh
{
ln
(
1+
P
z
‖h‖2
)
−
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1
×B(k+1, NA−1−k) 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
)}]+
(13)
where z is a function of h. For systems with non-adaptive
power allocation, the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound is
given as
C =
1
ln 2
[
exp
( z
P
) NA∑
k=1
Ek
( z
P
)
−
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1
×B(k+1, NA−1−k) 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
)]+
(14)
where z is a constant independent of h.
Fig. 1 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C
in (14) for systems with different numbers of antennas. We
see that the presence of multiple colluding Eves dramatically
reduces the secrecy rate, compared with the case of non-
colluding Eves. Furthermore, the secrecy rate quickly reduces
to zero at low to moderate SNR.
In the following subsections, we aim to give simplified
or approximated expressions of the secrecy capacity lower
bound in two special scenarios. These expressions will be
used to obtain analytical results and useful insights on the
optimal power allocation in Section IV. Note that the derived
approximation may not be an achievable secrecy rate, although
it is useful for the design of power allocation.
A. Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
In the case where Eves cannot collude, we have NE = 1.
Then C2 in (12) reduces to
C2 = Eh
{ 1
ln 2
1
z − 1
2F1
(
1, 1;NA;
z −NA
z − 1
)}
= Eh
{
1
ln 2
(NA − 1
NA − z
)NA−1
×
(
ln
(NA−1
z−1
)
−
NA−2∑
l=1
1
l
(NA−z
NA−1
)l)}
, (15)
where (15) is obtained using an identity for the Gauss hyper-
geometric function derived in Appendix I. This can then be
substituted into C = [C1−C2]+ to yield simplified expressions
for the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound.
B. Large NA Analysis
C1 in (7) can be rewritten as
C1 = Eh
{
log2
(
1 +
P
z
‖h‖2
)}
= log2NA + Eh
{
log2
( 1
NA
+
P
z
‖h‖2
NA
)}
. (16)
The law of large numbers implies that limNA→∞ ‖h‖2/NA =
1. Hence we focus on the non-adaptive power allocation
strategy where z is a constant. In the large NA limit, we have
lim
NA→∞
(C1−log2NA) = lim
NA→∞
Eh
{
log2
( 1
NA
+
P
z
‖h‖2
NA
)}
= log2
P
z
. (17)
That is to say, the difference between C1 and log2NA ap-
proaches log2 Pz as NA increases. Therefore, in the large NA
regime, we have3
C1 = log2
(NAP
z
)
+ o(1). (18)
From the law of large numbers, we also know that
limNA→∞G2G2
†/(NA − 1) = I . Using (9) with the non-
adaptive power allocation strategy, we have
lim
NA→∞
C2= lim
NA→∞
Eg
1
,G2
{
log2
(
1+
1
z−1
g1
†
(G2G2†
NA−1
)−1
g1
)}
= Eg
1
{
log2
(
1 +
1
z − 1
‖g1‖
2
)}
=
1
ln 2
exp(z − 1)
NE∑
k=1
Ek(z − 1), (19)
where ‖g1‖2 has a Gamma distribution with parameters
(NE , 1). We see from (19) that altering the number of antennas
3The notation f(x) = o(g(x)) implies that limx→∞ f(x)g(x) = 0. This limit
is taken w.r.t.NA in (18).
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C in (14) at 10 dB versus
the number of antennas at Alice NA for systems with different numbers
of colluding eavesdroppers. The large NA approximations of C in (20) are
shown as the dashed lines. The ratio of power allocation is set to φ = 0.5.
at Alice does not affect the channel capacity between Alice
and Eves in the large NA limit.
The ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound in the large NA
regime is then given by
C=
1
ln 2
[
ln
(NAP
z
)
−exp(z−1)
NE∑
k=1
Ek(z−1)+o(1)
]+
. (20)
In Section IV, we will use the expression (dropping o(1))
in (20) as an approximation of the secrecy capacity lower
bound for systems with large NA to study the optimal power
allocation.
Fig. 2 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C
in (14) as well as its large NA approximation in (20). We see
that (14) converges to (20) as NA increases. The convergence
is fast for small number of colluding Eves, e.g. NE = 2, and
is slow for large number of colluding Eves, e.g. NE = 6.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we study the optimal power allocation
between the information bearing signal and the artificial noise.
As we have discussed, the power allocation strategy can
be either adaptive or non-adaptive. The former depends on
every realization of the channel gain while the latter is fixed
for all channel realizations. The objective function for this
optimization problem is the ergodic secrecy capacity lower
bound. The closed-form expressions derived in the previous
section greatly reduce the computational complexity of the
optimization process. In the following, we first study the case
of non-colluding eavesdroppers and then look at the case of
colluding eavesdroppers.
A. Non-colluding Eavesdropper Case
The optimal value of φ or z can be easily found numerically
using the capacity lower bound expressions derived in Sec-
tion III. Moveover, these expressions enable us to analytically
obtain useful insights into the optimal z in the high SNR
regime as follows.
In the high SNR regime, i.e.,P  1, C1 in (7) can be
approximated as
C1 ≈ Eh
{
log2
(P
z
‖h‖2
)}
= Eh{log2(P‖h‖
2)} − Eh{log2 z}. (21)
We see in (21) that Eh{log2(P‖h‖2)} is a constant and
Eh{log2 z} does not directly depend on h although z may
be a function of h. Therefore, the high SNR approximation
of the secrecy capacity lower bound does not have h in its
expression (except for the expectation over h). Consequently,
for any value of h, the optimal z that maximizes the high
SNR approximation of the secrecy capacity lower bound is the
same. In other words, the value of h is irrelevant in finding
the optimal power allocation. Therefore, the adaptive power
allocation strategy does not need to be considered at high SNR.
The optimal value of z in the high SNR regime satisfies
dC
dz
=
dC1
dz
−
dC2
dz
= −
1
z ln 2
−
dC2
dz
= 0, (22)
where the derivative of C2 w.r.t. z can be computed in closed-
form using (15).
In the special case of NA = 2, (22) is reduces to
−
1
z
−
1
(z − 2)(z − 1)
+
ln(z − 1)
(z − 2)2
= 0. (23)
The solution to the above equation is given by z = 2. It can be
shown that limz→2 d
2C
dz2 < 0. Hence the optimal ratio of power
allocation is given by φ = 0.5, that is to say, equal power
allocation between the information signal and the artificial
noise is the optimal strategy in the high SNR regime for
NA = 2.
For large NA, using (19) with NE = 1, we have
dC2
dz
=
1
ln 2
(
exp(z−1)E1(z−1)−exp(z−1)E0(z−1)
)
=
1
ln 2
(
exp(z − 1)E1(z − 1)− (z − 1)−1
)
. (24)
Hence the optimal value of z satisfies
−
1
z
− ez−1E1(z − 1) +
1
z − 1
= 0, (25)
which gives z = 1.80. It can be shown that at z = 1.80,
d2C
dz2 < 0. Hence the optimal ratio of power allocation is given
by φ = 0.55 in the high SNR regime for sufficiently large
NA. We see that the difference between the optimal values of
φ for the smallest NA (i.e.,NA = 2) and asymptotically large
NA is very small.
Fig. 3 shows the optimal values of φ using the non-adaptive
power allocation strategy for systems with different numbers
of antennas at Alice NA. The values of φ are shown for
SNRs at which the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound is
positive. The general trend is that more power needs to be
allocated to the information signal as SNR or NA increases.
In the high SNR regime, we see that the optimal values of φ
converge to constant values. For NA = 2, the optimal value
of φ converges to 0.5, which agrees with our analytical result.
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Fig. 3. Optimal ratio of power allocation φ versus SNR P for different
numbers of antennas at Alice NA. The non-adaptive power allocation strategy
is used. The values of φ are shown for SNRs at which the ergodic secrecy
capacity lower bound is positive.
−10 −5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
SNR, dB
Er
go
di
c 
se
cr
ec
y 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 lo
w
er
 b
ou
nd
 
 
N
A
 = 16, optimal φ
N
A
 = 8, optimal φ
N
A
 = 4, optimal φ
N
A
 = 2, optimal φ
equal power allocation φ = 0.5
Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C in (14) versus SNR P
for different numbers of antennas at Alice NA. The non-adaptive power
allocation strategy is used. The ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound with
equal power allocation for each case, indicated by the solid line, is also shown
for comparison.
Furthermore, this constant value only increases slightly with
NA, and the maximum value is 0.55 which agrees with our
large NA analysis. These observations suggest that a near-
optimal yet simple power allocation strategy at moderate to
high SNR values is the equal power allocation between the
information signal and the artificial noise.
Fig. 4 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C
in (14) with the optimized φ using the non-adaptive power
allocation strategy. For comparison, we also include the ca-
pacity lower bound with equal power allocation, i.e.,φ = 0.5,
indicated by the solid lines. We see that the equal power
allocation strategy achieves nearly the same secrecy rate as
the optimal non-adaptive power allocation in all cases over a
wide range of SNR values. This confirms that equal power
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Fig. 5. Ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C in (13) and (14) versus SNR
P for different numbers of antennas at Alice NA. Both the adaptive and non-
adaptive power allocation strategies are used, indicated by the markers and
the lines, respectively.
allocation is a simple and generic strategy which yields close
to optimal performance in terms of the derived achievable
secrecy rate.
Fig. 5 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound
C in (13) and (14) with the optimized φ, using both the
adaptive and non-adaptive power allocation strategies. For the
adaptive power allocation, we apply a linear search on φ to find
the optimal value that maximizes the secrecy capacity lower
bound for each realization of h. The maximum value of the
secrecy capacity lower bound for each channel realization is
recorded and the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound is then
computed using the distribution of h. We see that there is no
difference between the secrecy rate achieved by the adaptive
and non-adaptive strategies over a wide range of SNR values.
The adaptive strategy only gives marginal advantage when
the secrecy rate is close to zero. This result suggests that the
non-adaptive power allocation strategy is sufficient to achieve
almost the best possible secrecy rate performance.4 For this
reason, we will only focus on the non-adaptive scheme in the
rest of this paper.
B. Colluding Eavesdropper Case
As we have seen in Fig. 1, the presence of multiple
colluding Eves severely degrades the secrecy rate. Therefore,
it is essential for Alice to have a relatively large number of
antennas to maintain a good secure communication link. For
any value of NE , the optimal value of φ or z can be easily
found numerically using the closed-form capacity lower bound
expression given in Section III. As the number of antennas at
Alice is desired to be large, we carry out large NA analysis
to obtain an asymptotic result on optimal z in the high SNR
regime as follows.
4The same result is found for the colluding Eves case. The numerical results
are omitted for brevity.
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Fig. 6. Optimal ratio of power allocation φ versus SNR P for systems with
different numbers of colluding Eves NE . The values of φ are shown for SNRs
at which the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound is positive.
In the high SNR regime with large NA, C in (20) can be
approximated as
C ≈
1
ln 2
[
ln(NAP )− ln z − exp(z − 1)
NE∑
k=1
Ek(z − 1)
]
. (26)
By taking the derivative of C w.r.t. z, the optimal z satisfies
−
1
z
− ez−1ENE(z − 1) +
1
z − 1
= 0. (27)
Using ez−1ENE (z − 1) ≈ (z − 1 +NE)−1 from [28], which
is accurate when either NE or z is large, (27) reduces to
−
1
z
−
1
z − 1 +NE
+
1
z − 1
= 0. (28)
Hence the optimal z is given by
z∗ = 1 +
√
NE. (29)
From (29) we see that the optimal value of z only depends
on NE in the high SNR and large antenna regime. Moreover,
(29) suggests that more power should be used to generate
artificial noise when the number of Eves increases.
Fig. 6 shows the optimal value of φ for systems with
different numbers of colluding Eves NE . Similar to the non-
colluding Eves case, we see that more power should be used to
transmit the information signal as SNR increases. The optimal
value of φ stays constant in the high SNR regime. Furthermore,
the optimal value of φ for colluding Eves case is usually much
smaller than 0.5, i.e., equal power allocation, which is near
optimal for non-colluding Eves case. In particular, the optimal
φ reduces as NE grows, which implies that more power should
be allocated to generate the artificial noise as the number of
colluding Eves increases. This observation agrees with our
analytical insight and intuition.
Fig. 7 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C in
(14) for systems with different NE . Here, we investigate the
sensitivity in the secrecy rate to the design of power allocation.
Consider a scenario where the total number of Eves that can
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Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound C in (14) versus SNR P for
systems with different numbers of colluding Eves NE . The solid lines with
markers indicate C achieved with optimal values of φ for the corresponding
system. The dashed lines indicate C achieved with value of φ optimized for
NE = 8, which represents the case where the power allocation was initially
designed for NE = 8, but the current value of NE reduces from 8 and the
power allocation is not redesigned.
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Fig. 8. The ratio of power allocation φ at 20 dB versus the number of
antennas at Alice NA for systems with different numbers of colluding Eves
NE . The solid lines with markers indicate the optimal values of φ, while the
dashed lines indicate the values of φ from the large antenna approximation
given in (29).
collude is 8, and hence Alice has optimized φ for NE = 8.
When NE changes, the power allocation parameter φ does not
need to be optimized again as long as NE stays reasonably
close to 8, e.g.,NE = 6, since the value of φ optimized for
NE = 8 still works well for NE = 6 (with a power loss
of 0.2 dB) as shown in Fig. 7. However, redesigning of φ
becomes important when NE is considerably different from 8,
e.g.,NE = 2 to 4. For example, if NE changes from 8 to 4, a
power loss of approximately 1 dB will incur if Alice still uses
the value of φ optimized for NE = 8, as shown in Fig. 7.
We also provide numerical verification of the optimal power
allocation obtained from the large antenna approximation
PC < z

 NA∑NE−1
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1 B(k+1, NA−1−k) 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
) − NA+1
2


−1
. (33)
PC < z

 NA(
NA−1
NA−z
)NA−1(
ln
(
NA−1
z−1
)
−
∑NA−2
l=1
1
l
(
NA−z
NA−1
)l) − NA + 12


−1
. (34)
in the high SNR regime. Fig. 8 shows the ratio of power
allocation φ at 20 dB versus the number of antennas at Alice
NA for systems with different numbers of colluding Eves NE .
For a fixed NE , we see that the optimal value of φ increases
with NA and reaches a constant value when NA is sufficiently
large. This agrees with our analytical insight that the optimal
power allocation depends on NE but not on NA when NA
is large. The asymptotic constant value of φ is close to the
analytical value given in (29) obtained from the large antenna
approximation.
In the system model, we have assumed fixed power trans-
mission over time. When variable power transmission is al-
lowed subject to an average power constraint, the achievable
secrecy rate can be increased by having temporal power allo-
cation according to the channel gain at each time instant. From
the derived secrecy rate expression, we see that the transmit
power only affects the transmission rate between Alice and
Bob. The existing study on the point-to-point channel capacity,
e.g. in [29], showed that the temporal power optimization gives
little capacity gain provided that the spatial power optimization
is used.
In reality, the noise is always present at the eavesdroppers
and hence, the designed power allocation strategy is not the
optimal strategy in practice. If the eavesdroppers’ noise levels
are known to the transmitter and hence are taken into account
in the secrecy rate expression, the efficiency of using artificial
noise in degrading the capacity between Alice and Eve is
reduced. Therefore, more power should be used to transmit
the information signal.
V. CRITICAL SNR FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Another important aspect of secure communication is the
minimum SNR required for a positive secrecy rate, which is
a critical parameter in wideband communications. With the
closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity lower bound
derived in Section III, one can numerically find the critical
SNR with low computational complexity. In this section, we
derive a closed-form upper bound on the critical SNR which
is useful in the design of wideband communications.
Using properties of the exponential integral function in [28],
(8) can be bounded from below as
C1 >
1
ln 2
NA∑
k=1
1
z
P
+ k
, (30)
which is asymptotically tight as the SNR approaches zero,
i.e.,P → 0. Using the convexity of (30) in k, we can further
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Fig. 9. The critical SNR PC versus number of antennas at Alice NA for
systems with different numbers of colluding Eves NE . The ratio of power
allocation is set to φ = 0.2. The solid lines with markers indicate the exact
value of PC , while the dashed lines indicate the analytical upper bound given
in (33).
bound C1 as
C1 >
1
ln 2
NA
z
P
+ NA+12
, (31)
which is also asymptotically tight as the SNR approaches zero.
Using the lower bound on C1 in (31) and C2 in (12), the
ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound can be further bounded
from below as
C >
1
ln 2
NA
z
P
+ NA+12
−
1
ln 2
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1
×B(k+1, NA−1−k) 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
)
. (32)
The critical SNR, denoted by PC , is the SNR at which C
drops to zero. With the lower bound on C given in (32), an
upper bound on PC can be found as (33) on the top of the
page. In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, i.e.,NE = 1,
(33) reduces to (34) on the top of the page. The upper bound
in (33) or (34) indicates a minimum SNR that guarantees a
positive secrecy rate. Since (33) and (34) are asymptotically
tight at low SNR, they can be used to fine tune the power
allocation parameter z to minimize PC .
Fig. 9 shows the critical SNR PC versus number of antennas
at Alice NA for systems with different numbers of colluding
PC <

1− σ2h˜
z
( NA∑NE−1
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1 B(k + 1, NA − 1− k) 2F1
(
1, k + 1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
) − NA + 1
2
)
− σ2
h˜


−1
, (42)
Eves NE . The power allocation is set to φ = 0.2 in all cases.
The general trend is that PC decreases as NA increases, and a
higher PC is required when NE increases. These observations
agree with intuition. Furthermore, we see that the analytical
upper bound on PC is very accurate for the case of non-
colluding Eves. For the case of colluding Eves, the upper
bound is reasonably accurate when PC < 0 dB. The difference
between the exact value of PC and its upper bound gradually
increases as NE increases, which is mainly due to the increase
in PC . When NE is relatively large, e.g.,NE = 6, one should
allocate more power to generate the artificial noise (i.e., reduce
φ), as suggested in Fig. 6, in order to achieve a lower PC ,
which in turn makes the bound tighter.
VI. EFFECT OF IMPERFECT CHANNEL STATE
INFORMATION
So far, we have assumed that the CSI can be perfectly
obtained at Alice and Bob. In this section, we investigate the
effect of imperfect CSI by considering channel estimation er-
rors. With imperfect CSI, the beamforming transmission from
Alice to Bob is designed based on the estimated channel gains
rather than the true channel gains. Therefore, the artificial
noise leaks into Bob’s channel.
To incorporate imperfect CSI, we consider that Bob per-
forms the MMSE channel estimation. Therefore, we have
h = hˆ+ h˜, (35)
σ2h = σ
2
hˆ
+ σ2
h˜
, (36)
where hˆ denotes the channel estimate and h˜ denotes the
estimation error. σ2h denotes the variance of each element in
h. σ2
hˆ
and σ2
h˜
denote the variance of each element in hˆ and h˜,
respectively. As a general property of the MMSE estimator for
Gaussian signals [30], hˆ and h˜ are uncorrelated, each having
i.i.d. complex Gaussian entries.
Similar to our system model in Section II, we assume that
the knowledge of hˆ is available at Alice and Eves. Therefore,
the beamforming vector becomes w1 = hˆ
†
/‖hˆ‖, and the
received symbol at Bob is given by
yB = hˆx+ h˜x+ n = ‖hˆ‖u+ h˜W [u v
T ]T + n. (37)
A capacity lower bound for the channel between Alice
and Bob can be obtained by considering h˜W [u vT ]T + n
as the worst case Gaussian noise [31]. Note that W is a
unitary matrix, hence h˜W has the same distribution as h˜ [32].
Therefore, the ergodic capacity lower bound for the channel
between Alice and Bob is given by
Cˆ1 = Ehˆ
{
log2
(
1 +
σ2u‖hˆ‖
2
σ2
h˜
P + 1
)}
. (38)
With σ2h normalized to unity, we have σ2hˆ = 1− σ
2
h˜
. Since
the elements of hˆ is i.i.d. complex Gaussian, ‖hˆ‖2 is a sum of
i.i.d. exponential distributed random variables, which follows
a Gamma distribution with parameter (NA, 1−σ2h˜). Therefore,
we obtain a closed-form expression for Cˆ1 as
Cˆ1 =
1
ln 2
exp
(
z
σ2
h˜
+ P−1
1− σ2
h˜
) NA∑
k=1
Ek
(
z
σ2
h˜
+ P−1
1− σ2
h˜
)
. (39)
The presence of channel estimation errors does not affect
the signal reception at Eve given in (4). Therefore, the ergodic
secrecy capacity lower bound can be obtained by subtracting
C2 from Cˆ1 as
C =
1
ln 2
[
exp
(
z
σ2
h˜
+ P−1
1− σ2
h˜
) NA∑
k=1
Ek
(
z
σ2
h˜
+ P−1
1− σ2
h˜
)
−
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1
B(k+1, NA−1−k)
× 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
)]+
. (40)
Following the steps in Section V, we can also bound C from
below in order to obtain an upper bound on the critical SNR
for secure communication with channel estimation errors as
C >
1
ln 2
NA
z
σ2
h˜
+P−1
1−σ2
h˜
+ NA+12
−
1
ln 2
NE−1∑
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
NA−1
z−1
×B(k+1, NA−1−k) 2F1
(
1, k+1;NA;
z−NA
z−1
)
. (41)
And the upper bound on the critical SNR is then given in (42)
on the top of the page, which is asymptotically tight at low
SNR.
We now present numerical results on the optimal power
allocation as well as critical SNR in the presence of the
channel estimation errors. For brevity, we focus on the case
of non-colluding eavesdroppers. The trends on the effect of
channel estimation errors observed in the following results also
apply to the case of colluding eavesdroppers.
Fig. 10 shows the optimal ratio of power allocation φ with
different channel estimation error variances σ2
h˜
. We see that the
channel estimation error has noticeable impact on the value of
φ, especially for small number of antennas at Alice, e.g.,NA =
2. The general trend is that less power should be allocated
to information signal as channel estimation error increases.
This is mainly due to the fact that the efficiency of improving
Bob’s signal reception by boosting the transmit power of the
information signal reduces as the channel estimation error
increases. On the other hand, the efficiency of degrading Eve’s
signal reception by boosting the transmit power of the artificial
noise stays the same regardless of the channel estimation error.
Hence, it is better to create more noise for Eves than to
increase the signal strength for Bob if the CSI is not accurately
obtained.
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Fig. 10. Optimal ratio of power allocation φ versus SNR P for different
numbers of antennas at Alice NA and different variances of the channel
estimation errors σ2
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. The values of φ are shown for SNRs at which the
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TABLE I
CRITICAL SNR (IN DB) FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WITH EQUAL
POWER ALLOCATION
Error variance Number of antennas NA
σ2
h˜
2 4 6 8 10
Exact 0 3.01 -2.62 -4.89 -6.36 -7.45
Upper bound 0 6.02 -1.97 -4.46 -6.01 -7.14
Exact 0.1 4.56 -1.88 -4.27 -5.79 -6.90
Upper bound 0.1 9.03 -1.20 -3.83 -5.43 -6.59
Exact 0.2 6.99 -1.01 -3.55 -5.13 -6.28
Upper bound 0.2 ∞ -0.26 -3.08 -4.76 -5.96
In practical systems, the channel estimation error usually
reduces as the SNR increases, although their exact relationship
depends on the training design. From Fig. 10, we can expect
that at low to moderate SNR where the channel estimation
error is usually noticeable, the optimal power allocation is
very different from that in the perfect CSI case. While at high
SNR where the channel estimation error is usually small, the
optimal power allocation is expected to be very close to that
of the perfect CSI case. Therefore, in practical systems it is
important to take channel estimation error into account when
designing the power allocation at relatively low SNR.
Table I lists the exact values of the critical SNR PC as well
as the closed-form upper bound given in (42) with φ = 0.5.
The general trend is that the critical SNR increases as the
channel estimation error increases, which agrees with intuition.
The upper bound gets tighter as PC reduces (or NA increases),
and is accurate for NA ≥ 4 with an error of less than 1 dB.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the secure communication
in the wireless fading environment in the presence of non-
colluding or colluding eavesdroppers. The transmitter is
equipped with multiple antennas and is able to simultaneously
transmit an information signal to the intended receiver and
artificial noise to confuse the eavesdroppers. We obtained
an closed-form expression for the ergodic secrecy capacity
lower bound. We studied the optimal power allocation between
transmission of the information signal and the artificial noise.
In particular, equal power allocation was shown to be a near
optimal strategy in the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
When the number of colluding eavesdroppers increases, more
power should be used to generate artificial noise. We also
derived an upper bound on the critical SNR above which
the secrecy rate is positive and this bound was shown to be
tight at low SNR. When imperfect channel state information
was considered in the form of channel estimation errors,
we found that it is wise to create more artificial noise to
confuse the eavesdroppers than to increase the signal strength
for the intended receiver. The results obtained in this work
provide various insights into the design and analysis of secure
communication with multi-antenna transmission.
APPENDIX I
IDENTITY FOR SPECIAL CLASS OF GAUSS
HYPERGEOMETRIC FUNCTION
Here we obtain a simplified expression for the Gauss
hypergeometric function in the form of 2F1(1, 1;N +1;x) or
2F1(N,N ;N + 1;x) for integer N ≥ 1. From [28], we know
that these two forms of the Gauss hypergeometric function are
related to each other by
2F1(1, 1;N + 1;x) = (1 − x)N−1 2F1(N,N ;N + 1;x). (43)
Also, we know from [28] that
dN−1
dxN−1
2F1(1, 1; 2;x)=
(1)N−1(1)N−1
(2)N−1
2F1(N,N ;N+1;x),
where (a)b is the rising factorial. Therefore, we have
2F1(N,N ;N + 1;x)
=
(2)N−1
(1)N−1(1)N−1
dN−1
dxN−1
2F1(1, 1; 2;x)
= −
N
(N−1)!
N−1∑
l=0
(
N−1
l
)
dl
dxl
ln(1−x)
dN−1−l
dxN−1−l
x−1, (44)
where we have used the identity 2F1(1, 1; 2;x) = − ln(1 −
x)/x from [28]. It is easy to show that
dk
dxk
ln(1− x) = −
dk−1
dxk−1
(1 − x)−1
= −
(k − 1)!
(1− x)k
, k = 1, 2, 3, ...
dk
dxk
z−1 =
(−1)kk!
xk+1
, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...
Substituting the above expressions for the derivatives into (44),
we obtain an identity expression as
2F1(N,N ;N + 1;x)
= −
N
(N − 1)!
(
ln(1− x)
(−1)N−1(N − 1)!
zN
−
N−1∑
l=1
(N − 1)!
l!(N − 1− l)!
(l − 1)!
(1 − x)l
(−1)N−1−l(N − 1− l)!
xN−l
)
=
(−1)NN
xN
(
ln(1− x)−
N−1∑
l=1
1
l
xl
(x− 1)l
)
. (45)
Using (43), we also have
2F1(1, 1;N + 1;x)
=
(−1)NN(1− x)N−1
xN
(
ln(1−x)−
N−1∑
l=1
1
l
xl
(x − 1)l
)
. (46)
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